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The Poetics of the Orphan in 
Abdelkébir Khatibi’s Early Work 
 
Matt Reeck 
University of California, Los Angeles 
Two of Abdelkébir Khatibi’s early works, La mémoire tatouée [Tattooed 
Memory] (1971) and Le lutteur de classe à la manière taoïste [Class Warrior—
Taoist Style] (1976), present a poetics of the orphan that in its different 
manifestations leads to a compelling ethics of encounter that defines 
Khatibi’s views on how to deal with cultural and social difference. I refer to 
the texts with the term “poetics” to suggest that they operate through 
inherent structures and thematic obsessions that assert that the term 
“orphan” can be recuperated from negative connotation to mean a positively 
constituted rootlessness. This rootlessness, in turn, when we consider it as 
characterizing a person in the face of cultural difference, presents an ethics 
of encounter. By “encounter,” I mean any meeting between any two people, 
as any such meeting presents the challenge of differences of all sorts—
religion, race, sex, culture, age, and so on. But within Khatibi’s context, a 
Moroccan writer whose oeuvre stretches over the historically significant 
moment of that country’s independence from colonial rule, we should also 
understand the word to mean the meeting of cultural difference. The first 
work presents an implicit poetics, with the term “orphan” used but 
infrequently; yet the text’s form itself, its stated themes, and the 
concentration of these themes upon a singular term, the “Very Large 
Violence” [la Très Grande Violence], all provide examples of what the 
poetics of the orphan can mean. In short, they begin to detail the dispersive, 
hopeful rootlessness of the orphan as this figure welcomes meeting with all 
sorts of difference, labeled under the umbrella category of the Other. In the 
second work, the term “orphan” takes on a more pronounced mediating and 
meditative role, as Khatibi uses it in this poetic manifesto on identity as an 
ideal figure capable of attaining useful knowledge and able to assert a 
philosophically satisfying stance for addressing the world. 
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To be an orphan is to be rootless; the notion of rootedness implies 
place. Hassan Wahbi writes of how place inheres in Khatibi’s work: “The 
originality of Khatibi is thus entirely in the work of relating the revelation of 
what the possibilities are for living the life of the sensible and for the finding 
of oneself in a place of being, a country” [L’originalité de Khatibi est ainsi 
tout entière dans ce travail de correspondance entre la révélation de ce qui 
est donné à vivre dans la fréquentation du sensible et la reconnaissance d’un 
lieu d’être, un pays].1 But we should be careful to read too literally the 
designation of country; some works seem rooted in specific places and their 
histories, but many works, perhaps the strong majority, seem to be first and 
foremost not accounts of historical times and places but of the processes and 
experiences of the life of the body and mind.2 Moreover, we find many 
statements issued by the writer himself about his distaste for the 
overvaluation of origins in various realms of thinking—summarized as the 
“metaphysics of origins”3—and his preference for that which I’ve designated 
the poetics of the orphan. In Le scribe et son ombre [The Writer and His Shadow], 
he writes of himself and his working methods: 
I think I’ve been made according to an identitarian fluidity and a 
multipolar inclination. […] I don’t have a fixed method. […] This 
multipolar inclination—I’ll speak to this later—encouraged in me a 
strong sentiment of uncertainty—by chance—that made me an 
orphan of all spiritual masters who would have served as models 
for me.4  
[Je crois m’être construit selon une fluidité identitaire et une 
tendance multipolaire. […] Je n’ai pas de méthode fixe […] Cette 
tendance multipolaire—sur laquelle je revendrai—nourissait en 
moi un fort sentiment d’incertitude qui m’avait—par chance—
rendu orphelin de tout maître spirituel qui aurait guidé ma 
formation.] 
As is well known, Khatibi continues his good friend Jacques Derrida’s 
critique of the cult of parousia, or pure presence, that defines the entire 
Western metaphysical tradition.5 Derrida reads metaphysics within the 
Western philosophical tradition as an onto-theology that depreciates the 
reality of difference within singularities. Above, Khatibi emphasizes the 
workings of the self as progressive, unstable, and multiple. Wahbi sees 
Khatibi’s polyvocal, polygraphic multivalence as being directed toward the 
conceptualizing of possibilities beyond traditional limits: 
Abdelkébir Khatibi is without a doubt a writer difficult to 
categorize, a writer of great variety, whose writing is without clear 
differences between genres or even texts. His variety is easy to 
understand: a plural oeuvre, rich and fascinating because of the 
audacity of forms and the risk of thoughts; we can take him to be a 
revealer of the possible.6  
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[Abdelkébir Khatibi est sans conteste un écrivain multiple et 
polygraphe dont l’espace d’écriture est sans frontière étanche entre 
genres ou textes. Sa polygraphie se comprend aisément: œuvre 
plurielle, foissonante et fascinante par l’audace des formes et le 
risque des pensées, on peut la prendre comme provenant d’un 
éveilleur de possibles.] 
Wahbi writes of Khatibi’s “passion for the unknown” [une passion pour 
l’inconnu].7 It is the orphan, cognizant of not having the rooting of a pure 
point of descendence, or any ancestry to speak of, who has a greater chance 
than others to exceed a point of origin, wandering into the world to discover 
what it contains. The figure of the orphan is, thus, the person who breaches 
frontiers; as such, the frontier belongs within the poetics of the orphan. Later 
in life, while writing about Freud, Khatibi again shows his investment in the 
idea and practice of exploring and exceeding frontiers. Here, he is interested 
in how disciplines shape knowledge negatively because of the usual practice 
of receding or retreating from a discipline’s frontier: “The question I propose 
to address is that of theoretical frontiers. All fields of knowledge are marked 
by a tracing out of limits where all theory, whatever it may be, suspends its 
exploration of the unknown.”8 Frontiers, for Khatibi, must be explored; these 
are the frontiers of nation, self, genre, mind, and sexuality.   
La blessure du nom propre [The Wound of Identity]9 is one of only two 
works that intervene between the two major works under investigation here. 
In that volume’s first essay, “Le cristal du texte” [“The Crystal of the Text”], 
he writes that the text itself is “an orphaned being, a being of exile” [un être 
orphelin, un être de l’exil].10 While I will return to the possible difference of 
the orphan and the exile, I note for the time being that he repeats the 
assertion about the text’s orphaned status in his last essay “La voix du récit” 
[“The Voice of the Text”] in conjunction with the idea of identity. First, 
identity itself is constituted through “the orphaned circulation [of identity]” 
[la circulation orpheline [du nom propre]];11 equally, the text itself has an 
orphaned status: “Like identity, the text is orphaned” [Comme le nom 
propre, le texte est orphelin].12 Properly conceived of, the logic of identity is 
the primary constraint upon the text itself: “The orphaned sign, identity 
constrains the text to the thinking of a nomadic identity expropriated in the 
desire for the other” [Signe orphelin, le nom propre contraint le texte à la 
pensée d’une identité nomade, expropriée dans le désir à l’autre].13 To read 
Khatibi, we must read his texts as pointing toward how the reader can 
conceive of both the text and latterly the world as sites for the nomadic 
existence of the orphan who exceeds frontiers where cultural difference does 
not represent the Glissantian threat of the superimposition of culture upon a 
silenced self but rather presents the hopeful possibility for growth and 
expansion of the self’s identity. 
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Mémoire: First Encounter 
The form of Khatibi’s autobiography embodies the poetics of the orphan in 
its openendedness, variability, and self-distancing from the standard 
inscription that autobiography presents, that is, the use of the trope of 
origins as the determining factor of identity, either in the persistence of some 
quality deemed bound to that first place and the incipient formation of the 
self, or in the repudiation of that place and what it symbolizes. Mémoire is 
composed of two lengthy chapters, or what Khatibi calls “wandering series” 
[série hasardeuse], an interesting title because in addition to highlighting the 
wandering, serial nature of the anecdotes to be recounted, the term suggests 
the danger and arbitrariness that characterizes the figure of the orphan: the 
danger inherent, supposedly, in not having parents to guide and care for the 
child; and the arbitrariness that comes to define connections, whether 
human or geographical (the two collapsing into one sense), when a person 
lacks parents. Autobiography is an excellent generic frame through which to 
question identity as a stable entity because the form allows Khatibi to 
critique self-consciously the way that autobiography creates identity 
through the act of narrating the past. Moreover, Khatibi is aware of how any 
act of self-narration, any act of anecdotal retelling, creates identity through 
the recital of the self. He presents himself as potentially orphaned when 
writing about how as a seven-year-old he witnessed the death of his father 
and how he was subsequently trundled between his grieving mother and a 
loving aunt: “The orphan of a father who had disappeared and two mothers, 
would I have a sort of toggle set inside me?” [Orphelin d’un père disparu et 
de deux mères, aurais-je le geste de la rotation?].14 Having admitted the 
uncertainty concerning the physical location and emotional poles of his 
childhood, he wonders whether his familial circumstances endowed him 
with a personal tendency toward restless movement, only avoiding the 
overvaluation of this possibility—the very one characteristic of the 
“metaphysics of origins”—by not declaring this idea in propositional syntax 
but rather by presenting it with the interrogative form’s open-endedness. He 
goes on to question the genre of autobiography:  
Is it possible, the portrait of a child? Because the past that I choose 
now like a motif of the tension between my being and its others 
settles into place just as does my incantatory celebration, itself a 
pretext for my desired violence leading to madness or any other 
circular idea. Who will write their own silence, a memory on the 
edge of nothingness?15 
[Est-ce possible, le portrait d’un enfant? Car le passé que je choisis 
maintenant comme motif à la tension entre mon être et ses 
évanescences se dépose au gré de ma célébration incantatoire, elle-
même prétexte de ma violence rêvée jusqu’au dérangement ou 
d’une quelconque idée circulaire. Qui écrira son silence, mémoire à 
la moindre rature?]  
1 3 6  |  T h e  P o e t i c s  o f  t h e  O r p h a n  i n  A b d e l k é b i r  K h a t i b i ’ s  
E a r l y  W o r k  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXV, No 1 (2017) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2017.706 
Wondering whether it’s even possible to write of his childhood, he sees how 
his narrative choices function as instruments for presenting versions of his 
self: whether he emphasizes “tension” or “celebration,” each has its own 
pre-inscribed, narrative agenda. His last rhetorical question encapsulates in 
his characteristically enigmatic language the conundrum of autobiography: 
because childhood is characterized by a sort of silence—the silence that 
precedes the adult’s necessity for self-narration, we might say—then each 
person must choose to emphasize something, to make something out of the 
child’s corporeal life of the present and the limited narrative scope that a 
child has for self-expression. A poetics of the orphan, then, criticizes the 
facile way in which autobiography generally maps a directed, focused 
narrative in a one-to-one way onto the self, creating a retrospective identity 
that nevertheless might fail to match the self in the present. The form, then, 
of Khatibi’s autobiography is orphaned from its presupposed genre in not 
abiding by its major tropes, not just because he negates the place of origins 
as being all important, but, here, in the way that the narrative’s meta-
critique breaks from transparency to ruin the sheen of inevitability inherent 
in the genre—its ability to present as self-effacing and self-evident the 
normalizing function of narrative upon the diversity, chaos, and resistance 
to narration that the self and experience present.  
Wahbi argues that the unifying rationale of Khatibi’s oeuvre is that 
“there is no conflict between the written text and the writer’s life” [Il n’y a 
point de conflit entre l’écriture et la vie].16 The transformation of the textual 
space into one not of the representation of the self, or a self-mimesis, but one 
that extends or increases life beyond the subtending physical life is a 
significant idea when considering the orphaned form of Mémoire and, more 
generally, how the poetics of the orphan becomes evident through many of 
the text’s thematic tropes. This transformation makes the act of writing and 
the act of reading the text into phenomenological experiences where the text 
emerges into the present tense as a staging ground presenting (making 
present) a self rather than re-presenting a formerly attributed self that the 
writer confirms for others through the act of re-presentation, or mimetic art. 
The importance of writing conceived as an act of exploration cannot be 
overemphasized in Khatibi; he takes it as a primary point of departure in 
this work, as he states in his preface, “[I]t was as if writing, in giving me to 
the world, reinitiated the shock of my life-force, in the fold of an obscure 
doubling” [comme si l’écriture, en me donnant au monde, recommençait le 
choc de mon élan, au pli d’un obscure dédoublement].17 This defines the act 
of writing as integral to life and becoming, an open, non-pre-determined act, 
just as life itself is constantly changing: élan is a vital and ongoing force, and 
thus the text is vital and full of a progressive expansion of the self rather 
than a retrospective confirmation.  
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This sense of writing as leading to the development of identity leads to 
the poignant portrait of himself during his adolescence, when he, like many 
teenagers, knew that his “real life,” his mature life, had not yet developed; 
writing was one means through which he sought its realization: 
I was floating. What orphaned or aggressive story could push me 
out of this condition? I was waiting for time to unwind, for my real 
life to start in an exaltation of a new birth. […] I wrote, without 
desperation but so as to control my somnambulism, my 
rootlessness. I wrote because it was the only way to disappear from 
the world, to save me from chaos, to hone me through solitude.18  
[Je flottais. Quelle histoire orpheline ou agressive pouvait me 
dessaisir? J’attendais que se dénouât le temps, que commençât ma 
vraie vie dans l’exaltation d’une nouvelle naissance. […] J’écrivais, 
acte sans désespoir et qui devait subjuguer mon sommeil, mon 
errance. J’écrivais puisque c’était le seul moyen de disparaître du 
monde, de me retrancher du chaos, de m’affûter à la solitude.] 
The act of writing becomes refuge and assertion of the self. It is a double 
movement: through “disappearing,” he appears. This is an important hinge 
in the narrative not only because it marks another moment of using writing 
as an exploration of the self and a transition from the adolescent to the adult 
man—a thematic trope that positions the text as autobiography, to be sure—
but also because this moment of self-questioning and self-questing will 
eventually lead him toward the open desire to live in the present, in the 
world that the present offers, which characterizes the figure of the orphan. 
This turn can also be seen in the reiteration of a single phrase, namely, “of 
aggression and love,” the first mention of which occurs in a passage where 
he sketches his thoughts about how to define himself, and the latter at the 
text’s very end when Khatibi’s reconsiders the ontology of the self and its 
various potentialities. The first is as follows: 
The mythic redolence of this encounter with the West led me 
toward a single quavering image of the Other, a contradiction of 
aggression and love. As an adolescent, I wanted to define myself in 
the nostalgic retelling of the initial myth.19  
[La fraîcheur mythique de cette rencontre avec l’Occident me 
ramène à la même image ondoyante de l’Autre, contradiction 
d’agression et d’amour. Adolescent, je voulais me définir dans 
l’écoute nostalgique du mythe initial.]  
At this early point in his life, the West is a symbol for all that might be 
contained within difference. The image must be like that of a mirage, 
quavering in the near distance, because, first, he has still to explore the West 
as Other, but also, and just as importantly, when we think more broadly, if 
there is one other, an other, there is another and another as well. He returns 
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to this point. Identity is not a polar construction, an alternation between the 
West and Morocco, as it were; it is when he is introduced to philosophy in 
college in Marrakech that he realizes how mixed-up his identity is, and how 
the fact of its mixing, its jerryrigging, points to the fact of the multi- and 
poly- ontology of the self. Interestingly, it’s his realization of the instability 
of Western culture that leads to his epiphany. His sense of the grouping of 
many under the one comes to be defined usefully with the term “bricolage”:  
I recognized in that culture the mixing knowledge, repression, and 
disorientation; I noticed how all of this conformed exactly to my 
being. [The] West is a part of me, which I can deny only in so much 
as I struggle against all wests and easts that oppress me or that 
disenchant me.20  
[Je reconnaissais de cette culture le bricolage du savoir, la 
répression, le dépaysement ; j’en saisissais la faille dans l’intimité 
de mon être. [L]’Occident est une partie de moi, que je ne peux nier 
que dans la mesure où je lutte contre tous les occidents et orients 
qui m’oppriment ou me désenchantent.]  
The noun and adjective “double,” as well as the verb “double” [dédoubler], 
are everywhere in the text and in Khatibi’s discourse concerning the self, 
but, ultimately, doubleness itself isn’t enough for Khatibi. A double is just 
two, and in this, we might say that the second merely reaffirms the first 
principle; that is, the double is, in one way, but the minor face of the first. In 
his thinking through the expansion of identity beyond parousia, he renders 
the West in lower case and pluralizes it, and with the similar transformation 
of the notion of the East, we then see the constitutive plurality of the self. In 
the same passage, he shows us that this multivalence of the self requires a 
renunciation of nostalgia; without a dominating, monolithic (or 
monolingual) past, the self can be ventriloquized through the “love of the 
Other”: “To love the Other is to talk in the lost place of memory” [Aimer 
l’Autre, c’est parler le lieu perdu de la mémoire].21 The poetics of the orphan 
sponsors a subject position of variability and openness.22 
Returning to the passage in which “of aggression and love” was cited 
above, we see how, if the mythic Other represents aggressive violence and 
love, nevertheless violence and love aren’t held primarily within the Other; 
rather, it is through the process of identifying and disidentifying with the 
Other that violence and love are produced. This is echoed in the “struggle” 
against oppression, and this term foreshadows the second text under 
discussion here. When he reprises the same language in the book’s 
penultimate section, the miniature play, or dialogue, “Double contre double 
(Dialogue)” [“Double against double (dialogue)],” he again describes the 
toggle between the presumed one and the other as being not that between 
two entities but rather a “pure explosion of signs”: 
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A: […] to descend into myself, in my double identity, or if you 
prefer to sharpen the pure explosion of signs, by a movement of 
aggression and love […] It was about violence, in a combination of 
greater and greater complexity […] In fact, this combination came 
about from nowhere but the pure explosion of signs.23  
[A: […] descendre soi-même, dans sa double identité, ou si tu 
préfères aviver la pure éclosion des signes, par un mouvement 
d’agression et d’amour […]  Il s’agit bien de la violence, dans une 
combinaison de plus en plus complexe […] Disons la stricte vérité, 
cette combinaison ne se désigne que dans la pure éclosion des 
signes.]  
He couches the phrase “pure explosion of signs” as meaning the infinite 
combinations for the identity possible through identifying and 
disidentifying with, or otherwise through interacting with, the world.  
The myth of ancestry comes under intense scrutiny as well. Khatibi 
describes it in various terms, but the text is bookended by the phrase “the 
trajectory of maternity” [l’archet maternel].24 The person nostalgic for origins, 
for roots, is the inverse figure to the orphan, the person opened to difference. 
Without acknowledging his “double identity” [sa double identité], the 
nostalgic, ancestry-obsessed person “is left adrift in a vague land or in pure 
nostalgia” [identité à basculer dans un terrain vague ou dans la nostalgie 
pure].25 An orphan is, by contrast, never lost, but rather fully conscious of the 
possibilities for realizing a mature identity beyond any essentializing 
movement toward the consolidation of identity around a node of first 
emergence, or origins. Khatibi dramatizes the violence inherent in this 
position of expansion and the constant challenge of re-forming identity 
through the term “the Very Large Violence” [la Très Grande Violence].26 This 
term serves as a sort of umbrella signifier or conceptual referent. Its violence 
is not negative or excessive; it is not terrorizing, terrible, terrifying or awful. 
His last mention of the “Very Large Violence” summarizes it as a tripartite 
energy or momentum—in short, the very nature of the exploration of 
identity: first, the tattoo [tatouage], the trace of ancestry upon the body; 
second, perfume [parfum], with its evocation of the most basic and least 
understood of the senses—the sense of smell—the ambient trace that “calls 
the person toward the unknown” [m’ouvre lui aussi des énigmes]; and the 
sign [graphe], with its own multivalence signifying both the letter, and thus 
logos, and the aesthetic mark, or artistic sign.27 To knot and to unknot [nouer, 
dénouer], to tear and to impress [déchirer, inscrire] are the modalities for 
fulfilling identity in all of its potential richness; they have within them a 
violence of union and disentanglement that takes place within the self. 
Without the moorings of a stable, even, we might say, overdetermined, past, 
the orphan is a figure of the present. Being in the present is a form of being 
orphaned; it is being without the guarantee of a narrative of the self, without 
the guarantee of the potential for autobiography. The poetics of the orphan 
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is implicit here; the Very Large Violence is the spirit of the identity’s 
bricolage as the self moves from the traces of the past writ upon the body, 
the page, and imbibed through the air; and toward an orientation of 
constant renovation that characterizes the orphan in the world. 
 
Lutteur: Second Encounter 
Mémoire presents an implicit poetics of the orphan; Lutteur employs an 
explicit version of the same. The second work is introduced, in a way, by the 
first through two uses of the phrase “class warrior” [lutteur de classe]. The 
first instance comes when Khatibi writes about his childhood living beneath 
the heavy shadow of his father and elder brother: “With time, I found myself 
without father and elder brother—his impossible image—while I dreamed 
of abolishing all tribes, of becoming a class warrior” [Avec le temps, j’ai 
succédé au père, à l’aîné—son image impossible—, alors que je rêve d’abolir 
toute tribu, d’être lutteur de classe].28 Khatibi implements Marxist rhetorical 
flourishes in Lutteur to help generate the rhetorical vigor necessary for a 
manifesto. The phrase “class warrior” signifies within Khatibi’s early work 
not a literal Marxist apparatchik or revolutionary, but rather it points, as the 
quote above signals, to Communism as a form capable of erasing the 
nostalgia of ancestry that Khatibi feels restrains people from achieving a 
correct view of identity and from fulfilling their potential growth through 
encounters with other people and their cultures. The phrase’s second and 
final comes when Khatibi begins his postface to Mémoire; here, the term finds 
metaphoric value in the idea of a literary “warrior”: “To be a class warrior in 
‘the tribe of words,’” [Etre lutteur de classe dans ‘la tribu des mots’].29 The 
rhetoric of revolution and warring (or, warriors) serves to emphasize the 
vigor that Khatibi believes characterizes the nature of identity as the self 
develops through meeting the constant challenge of the present’s 
heterogeneity and potential for difference. This contextualizing is of the 
utmost value as we try to understand Lutteur as a poem-cum-manifesto 
because it leads us away from a direct confrontation with the historical 
circumstances of the time, namely, we understand that this text does not 
serve a literal Marxist-political perspective that would ask us to reconcile it 
with the French left’s support of the Marxist revolution in Cambodia led by 
Pol Pot.30    
While the Marxist vocabulary of Lutteur may be its most noticeable 
lexical feature, it is the poetics of the orphan that dominates as theme. The 
word “orphan” (whether as noun or adjective) is present eighteen times, 
appearing for the first time in the second numbered poem and being, in fact, 
the text’s very last word, where the manifesto’s speaker concedes with 
perhaps false reluctance to be a prophet of the poetics of the orphan, “I steal 
the title of the orphaned prophet” [je prendrai furtivement le titre de sage 
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orphelin].31 The manifesto is an excellent form through which to propagate 
his beliefs about the self’s achieving its fulfillment through an openness to 
difference.32 Khatibi avails himself of the genre’s vigor to profess his beliefs. 
The openly antagonistic tone that characterizes the form leads, as Mary Ann 
Caws notes, to a form that is “loud, immodest, excess[ive], and exuberant.”33 
These are all qualities on display in Lutteur. Morevoer, it is through the 
opposition to something that the ideological ends of the manifesto find their 
correct tack: “As if defining a moment of crisis, the manifesto generally 
proclaims what it wants to oppose, to leave, to defend, to change. Its 
oppositional tone is constructed of againstness and generally in a spirit of a 
one time only moment.”34 The crisis, as outlined in the text’s first lines, is that 
of the hollowness of words and mistaken ways of thinking: 
history is a word 
ideology a word 
the unconscious a word 
words are like dares 
in the mouths of the ignorant 
 
[…] don’t get lost in your own thinking 
don’t disappear into that of others35  
 
[l’histoire est un mot 
l’idéologie un mot 
l’inconscient un mot 
les mots voltigent 
dans la bouche des ignorants 
 
[…]ne t’envole pas dans ta propre parole 
ne t’évanouis pas dans celles des autres] 
It is against this backdrop, which suggests the unveiling of a “correct” way 
of thinking, that the next poem introduces the figure of the orphan. We are 
to understand that the orphan, then, is the correct thinker in addition to 
being the literary “class warrior”—in short, the paragon of thinking and 
acting—and that Khatibi’s poem’s speaker is the correct, or righteous, 
educator: 
the orphan 
is the class warrior 
the sovereign orphan 
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[…] everyone cherishes identity 
everyone looks for origins 
and I teach orphan knowledge 
 
[…]I teach difference without return 
and precision violence 
that’s what “orphan” means36  
 
[orphelin  
est le lutteur de classe  
souverainement orphelin 
 
[…] tout le monde chérit l’identité 
tout le monde cherche l’origine 
et moi j’enseigne le savoir orphelin 
 
[…] j’enseigne la différence sans retour 
et la violence exacte 
tel est le sens du mot <orphelin>] 
 
The implicit poetics of the orphan in Mémoire has become a detailed 
exposition: in both, the speaker positions himself against the obsessive 
search for origins, but, here, the speaker proposes “difference without 
return,” a constant drive toward the Other that leads to a radical position of 
the self’s constant renovation through incorporating aspects of the new and 
different; the rhetorical vehicle of the Very Large Violence has morphed into 
a Marxist revolutionary; and in this positioning of the subject so as to make 
it impossible to return to false origins, there is “precision violence” not 
unlike the demand placed upon the self of the Very Large Violence’s 
“contradiction” and “movement of aggression and love.” We see an explicit 
poetics of the orphan in which we must acknowledge the importance of the 
orphan’s sovereignty. The word “sovereignty” means not only the ideas of 
personal freedom and political self-rule, but it also suggests the qualities of 
power, activity, and possibility. The sovereign orphan, then, stands in sharp 
contrast to the exile, a figure burdened by the weight of nostalgia, loss, 
personal and political powerlessness, and, thus, a person without the desire 
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or ability to act in the present. The text makes the inverse relationship, or 
portraiture, of these two figures clear at one important juncture: 
identity difference 
two words to point to the same knot 
 
to untie these words […] 
is to enter into exile 
to consign oneself wildly to the other 
is to open oneself to difference without return37 
 
[identité différence 
deux mots pour nommer le même nœud 
 
dénouer ces mots […] 
c’est se mouvoir dans l’exile 
s’exiler sauvagement à l’autre 
c’est s’ouvrir à la différence sans retour]  
The word choice in French is particular: the negatively connoted exile is, as I 
mentioned, passive; but the positively connoted orphan is a self-willing exile 
who acts violently without self-pity [s’exiler sauvagement] to effect his ends. 
This is the heart of the poetics of the orphan, the tying of identity to 
difference. Identity is tied to forward-leaning difference, inverting the usual 
belief in the importance of origins for the stability and vitality of the self. To 
disassociate the two, to “untie these words,” is the same as giving up on the 
potential for self-realization that can take place through the meeting with 
others. A person, then, becomes an exile for him- or herself in the way that 
not fulfilling this destiny of identity through difference consigns the self to a 
diminishing identitarian space of atrophy, decay, and decomposition. These 
motifs continue through the manifesto. The violence of the class warrior is 
necessary to separate himself from the nostalgia of personal history. He 
holds against himself the threat of annihilation in order to achieve self-
realization. Life is inherently violent; the formation of the self is also so, and 
just as in Mémoire where Khatibi announces that his goal is to “vary myself 
to infinity” [me varier à l’infini],38 here too the same language erupts in the 
acknowledgement that “the world is a wound” [la blessure au monde]. 
When this fact is borne constantly in mind, the speaker pronounces he is 
“infinitely orphaned” [je suis infiniment orphelin] and “capable of 
destroying myself” [capable de me détruire].39 As harsh or challenging as this 
position may seem, it is the poetics of the orphan.  
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This constant openness to difference and willingness to destroy a 
momentary version of the self finds expressive motifs in the idea and act of 
voyages and migrations. If the poetics of place accrues symbolic weight 
through the register of connotations surrounding placement, then the 
poetics of the orphan relies upon an imaginary of displacement to generate 
its affective reach. Perhaps at the center of the affective power of the ideas of 
placement and displacement is the metaphor and first mooring of the body.40 
Khatibi’s speaker defines the body as discombobulated, a non-body, 
effectively. At the very least, a non-singular body: “place your body in the 
pleasure of the other / […] without a center without a right or left / will 
your body be the sovereign orphan?” [déplace ton corps dans le plaisir de 
l’autre / […] sans centre sans droite ni gauche / ton corps sera-t-il 
souverainement orphelin?].41 The manifesto ends with the most image-laden 
and scenically evocative poem. Here, the voyage of the self into the land of 
the Other takes on magical realistic dimensions. We find the speaker on a 
boat, having “abandoned the ordered course” [et voici que je quitte la 
parabole ordonnée];42 he falls asleep over his ruminations about life; he 
wakes up on a shore of an unknown desert, where he is greeted by a hunter 
of sunken treasures and a gazelle. Finally, the treasure hunter speaks to him, 
reminding him that the desert is an “orphaned truth” [une vérité 
orpheline],43 and imploring him to “separate yourself again from your 
origins from your childhood” [sépare-toi encore de ton origine de ton 
enfance].44 It is only then that the truth of the self’s plurality can be grasped. 
 
Poetics of the Orphan to Ethics of Encounter 
This paper has attempted to sketch out the major moments and motifs of 
Khatibi’s poetics of the orphan used in different manners but for similar 
ends in two of his first major works. The word “poetics” in this context 
suggests a working method and philosophical preoccupation. While it’s not 
my desire to suggest that a poetics leads necessarily to an ethics, certainly, as 
I hope this paper has shown, the poetics of the orphan is intimately tied to 
an ethics of encounter. In meeting others, we find ourselves, Khatibi 
suggests, not merely by identifying with others, but we find ourselves in 
others, dissolving the rational, corporeal divide of beings into an affective 
network of shared feelings, perspectives, and mutual definition—two parts 
of a larger bricolage unity and not two separate nodes held at bay in discrete 
austerity.45   
Lionnet notes that Khatibi’s belief in the “radical potential of open 
exchange”46 projects an air of utopianism: “Khatibi’s gesture toward a 
knowable and attainable future has a quasi utopian dimension congruent 
with his belief that openness to heterogeneity, heteroglossia, and 
heterophony […] holds a promise and is ‘le signe d’un advenir dans un monde à 
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transformer’ [the sign of a future yet to come, of a future becoming in a world 
in need of change] (Khatibi 1985: p. 63).”47 But it would be hard to argue that 
Khatibi’s poetics of the orphan ascends to the status of utopian reverie for, at 
the very least, the reason that the violence each person must wreck upon the 
self makes it far from an easy feat. The realization of the multifaceted self is a 
sort of life’s work. But, I take it, that’s one reason Lionnet couches her 
characterization as “quasi utopian.” Latterly, if there is a hopefulness within 
the ethics of encounter to which the poetics of the orphan leads us, there is 
no reason to feel as though a hopeful ethics must be pushed aside for a more 
conceivably practical—viz. unhopeful— ethics of encounter.  
In the poetics of the orphan, Khatibi’s thinking about identity is 
remarkable for its openness to others, as well as to the future—“an identity 
that is to come” [une identité qui est en devenir], cribs de Toro.48 Many of his 
ideas accord with, or prefigure in some way, those of Jean-Luc Nancy in The 
Creation of the World, or Globalization.49 Khatibi was, in his own words, a 
“believer [in] alternative globalization”;50 in particular, the sort that Nancy 
marks against the imperial form of globalization as that of “mondialisation” 
[world-forming]: “[t]he word mondialisation, by keeping the horizon of a 
‘world’ as a space of possible meaning for the whole of human relations (or 
as a space of possible significance) gives a different indication than that of an 
enclosure in the undifferentiated sphere of a unitotality [which characterizes 
globalization].”51 The world is absolutely for Khatibi’s orphan a “space of 
possible meaning for the whole of human relations.” Khatibi’s idea of 
identity subsumes, or includes, all of the world and its peoples. The identity 
of an individual is inseparable from the whole of what constitutes the 
human. Nancy insists that the world (though, presumably, he means that of 
the Western-oriented world) was transformed from something whose value 
lay in a vertical relationship with God in heaven to a horizontal relationship 
with other humans; his “new” world is a world opened to difference, a 
world that is, like that of Khatibi’s orphan, shorn from the narcissistic fable 
of origins: 
If the world, essentially, is not the representation of a universe 
(cosmos) nor that of a here below (a humiliated world, if not 
condemned by Christianity), but the excess—beyond any 
representation of an ethos or a habitus—of a stance by which the 
world stands by itself, configures itself, and exposes itself in itself, 
relates to itself without referring to any given principle or to any 
determined end, then one must address the principle of such an 
absence of principle directly. This must be named the “without-
reason” of the world, or its absence of ground.52  
Separating ourselves from the religious commentary, we can see that 
Nancy’s thinking shares with Khatibi’s critique of origins a willingness to 
turn from a foundational myth: separated from a pre-ordained location and 
its inherent value (“ethos” and “habitus”), the self enters into a new 
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condition, describable either as the “without-reason” and 
“groundless[ness]” of the world, or the world of the orphan, both of which 
foster endless encounters with others. Nancy’s statements in his book’s latter 
portions also coincide with Khatibi’s desire to exceed identitarian 
boundaries: “By virtue of the gift and the incessant sharing of the world one 
does not know where the sharing of a stone or of a person begins or ends”; 
and “What is appropriate is thus defined by the measure proper to each 
existent and to the infinite, indefinitely open, circulating and transforming 
community (or communication, contagion, contact) of all existences between 
them.”53 These two passages resonate with Khatibi’s ethics of encounter. The 
correspondence in thinking suggests that there exists an intellectually 
enriching and not yet explored dialogue between Khatibi and Nancy, and, 
beyond Nancy himself, between Khatibi and those thinkers, scholars, and 
social agents who, whether through the lens of theories of globalization or 
the social realities of current human migrations, are thinking about the 
possible ethics of encounter available to us today. 
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